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BREAKING OUT OF THE REGULATO RY DILEMMA:
ALTE RNATIVES TO THE STERILE CHOICE 
Roger G. Noll':' 
Economic research has played an important role in the 
current debate over regulatory policy. Since 1959, economists
have generated a massive literature on the economic consequences 
of regulation. _/ By 1975, the leading spokesman for regulatory 
_/ The seminal work is J, Meyer, M. Peck, J, Stenason and 
C. Zwick, The Economics of Competition in the Transportation 
Industry, Harvard, 1959. While this study was hardly the first 
to criticize regulatory policy, it was a major advance in the sophis­
tication and completeness of research on regulatory effects. 
reform in the federal government was an economist who had contri­
buted several important studies, ranging from a book on the origins 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to a statistical analysis 
of the effects of Federal Power Commission regulation of natural 
gas field prices, _!
_j P. MacAvoy, The Effects of Regulation: The Trunkline 
Railroad Cartels and the .ICC before 19001 MIT, 1965, and "The
'-' Financial support for preparing this paper was provided by the 
National Science Foundation RANN progra.m, grant #APR75-16566. 
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Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, " Journal of Law and 
Economics, October 1970.
To my knowledge, no economic evaluation of a regulatory 
activity has produced a clean bill of health for the policy under 
review. Economists uniformly find immense indirect costs due to 
regulation, with little or no benefit. While most of these findings 
pertain to the regulation of entry, prices and profits in the major 
infrastructural industries, the results with respect to safety and 
environmental regulation are essentially the same, although here 
the results are less convincing. _j
_j Two highly publicized studies of safety regulation, both by 
S. Peltzman, are "The Effect of Automobile Safety Regulation, 11 
Journal of Political Economy, July/ August 1975, and Regulation 
of Pharmaceutical Innovation: The 1962 Amendments, American 
Enterprise Institute, 1974.
The natural inference from these studies is that regulation 
has uniformly failed and ought to be dispensed with, or at least 
drastically reforrned. But this conclusion does not necessarily 
follow from the recitation of the research results. 
Empirical estimates of the "cost of regulation" are 
normally measures of the extent to which the performance of an 
industry departs from maximal efficiency -- that is, from a situa­
tion in which price is equal to the additional costs incurred in 
producing the last unit of output and total output is produced at 
the minimum feasible cost. Practically speaking, this will occur 
only if an industry is perfectly competitive. Consequently, the 
estimates of the costs of regulation constitute a case for deregula­
tion only ,if an industry would be perfectly competitive in the 
absence of government intervention. 
In many cases the principal barrier to competition is, 
in fact, regulation. Examples are trucking, trunk airlines, 
agricultural commodities subject to marketing orders, securities 
markets, banking, and local passenger transportation. In these 
cases the only sensible issue is how to devise a reasonable tran­
sition to the deregulated state. In other instances, it is likely 
that deregulation would not result in perfect competition. The 
relevant policy issue in these cases is which alternative is least 
costly. Here the choices are not easy because the alternatives 
that are normally considered all have serious liabilities, 
INHERENT PROBLEMS O F  REGULATION 
As a procedure for controlling market behavior, the 
administrative process has certain inherent weaknesses. The 
first arises because it is a process in which policy decisions are 
made by passive, judicial-like officials on the basis of informa­
tion supplied to them in a formal adversary proceeding. This 
procedure creates the dilemma of bias or delay. 
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If only some interested parties are represented in a pro­
ceeding, the dependence of decisions on the content of·the formal 
record causes decisions generally to favor those who are repre­
sented. If all parties are represented in a proceeding, the amount 
of information fed into the process, the time spent responding to 
points made by opponents, and the greater care required to write 
a decision that will withstand appeal all add considerably to the 
time the agency takes to make a decision, and to the direct cost 
of the process. To illustrate, in 1973 AEC cases to issue con­
struction permits for nuclear power .plants averaged six months 
in duration when no one participated but the applicant and 29 
months when an intervenor was granted full standing. More 
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generally, the source of much of the recent criticism that the 
regulatory process is too slow has been the growing use of inter­
vention by environmentalists and consumer groups. While agencies 
have responded to these new circumstances by streamlining some 
procedures, _j they can never succeed completely and still satisfy 
_
/
See P. Joskow, "Inflation and Environmental Concern: 
Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation, 11 
Journal of Law and Economics, V. 17 No. 2 (October 1974). 
procedural requirements, Attempts to short circuit normal pro­
cedures, such as by denying standing to intervenors or resorting 
to informal processes, have been attempted, but have been sternly 
rebuked by the courts. _
/ 
I- For example, see Moss v. CAB, 430 Fed. 981 (U. S. D. C. 
for District of Columbia), 1970, See also the statement of Ruben 
B. Robertson, in U. S. Senate, Committee on Government Opera­
tions and Committee on Commerce, To Establish an Independent 
Consumer Protection Agency: Joint Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st 
Session, 1973. 
A second general problem of the administrative process
is its inherent conservatism. Typically the burden of proof is 
on those who would change the status quo. They must demonstrate 
through evidence that a change in regulatory rules and policies is 
desirable. Prior to the mid-l 960s, when the rate of inflation was 
generally below the rate of productivity advance in public utility 
sectors, the utilities benefited from this characteristic of regula­
tion. In that period the proper direction of change was for price 
reductions, with the burden of proof on those who would force 
utilities to cut prices. In the 1970s, with costs on the rise ·and 
the appropriate direction of change in the opposite direction, the 
burden of proof has switched to utilities. As a result, util�t�es 
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have moved from a period in which their rates of retu�n generally 
exceeded the cost of capital to one in whi.ch many utilities, if not 
facing bankrupcy, at least are not suffici.ently profitable to attract 
new capital. _j
_
/ 
See Joskow, op. cit. , and P. Joskow and P. MacAvoy, 
" Regulation and the Financial Condition of the Electric Power 
Compa�ies in the 1970s, 11 American Economic Review LXV #2 
(May 1975). 
The conservatism of regulatory agencies is partly related 
to the representation problem discussed above. In order to find 
it worthwhile to be represented in the regulatory process, a group 
must perceive the stake it has in the issue at hand. Suppose the 
issue is the adoption of a new technology or the prohibition of a 
possibly hazardous substance. In both cases, those who derive 
their income from existing methods are more likely to be aware 
of their stakes in the issue than are those who would gain from 
change. Workers who would be employed in the use of the new 
technology once it is standardized have not been hired when its 
adoption is debated, nor are all of those who are threatened by a 
hazardous substance likely to be aware of the danger. In the
debate over cable regulations before the FCC, for example, the 
cable television industry has been represented by an <!1-SSociation 
comprised of existing systems, yet the key to the development of 
cable is the set of regulations that now keep cable out of most of 
the hundred largest metropolitan areas. Since some of the 
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entrepreneurs who would invest in such systems are not yet in the 
industry, and some of the industry's potential customers are not 
yet fully aware of the nature of the service that might be offered 
them, the representation of cable is not in the same proportion to 
its stake in the issue as is that of commercial broadcasters. _/ And 
_/ For a more complete treatment of the representation problem, 
see R. Noll, "Government Administrative Behavior and Technological 
Innovation, " Social Science Working Paper #62, California Institute 
of Technology. For a more thorough treatment of the application of 
these arguments to cable television, see R. Noll, M. Peck and J. 
McGowan, Economic Aspects of Television Regulation, Brookings, 
1973, Chapters 4 and 7. 
because cable interests have fewer resources to commit to the 
regulatory process, they presumably will be less effective in 
dealing with the regulators, assuming, of course, that the quality 
of representation is important in determining outcomes. 
A third problem inherent in regulation is the inflexibility 
that arises from the decision theory that underpins it. The basic 
model of the regulatory decision-maker is an expert philosopher­
king. Two important assumptions lie behind this model: (1) that 
an unambiguous "best" decison exists "in the public interest" and 
(2) that it tan be identified by an expert through collecting, analyzing 
and evaluating information about the problem. Social science 
theory is firm in rejecting the first assumption, whether the test 
be the maximization of real economic output or majority approval 
in a political process. In both cases, indeterminancies are the 
rule, rather than the exception.J 
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_/ The weakest conditions under which GNP maximization leads 
to an unambiguously preferred position are that all people have. 
identical tastes and place equal value on an increment to their 
incomes. See J. Chipman and J, Moore, "The New Welfare 
Economics: 1939-1974," mimeo, Depart1nent of Economics, 
University of Minnesota, 1974. Recent e1npirical work has con­
firmed the presence of cyclic social preferences in actual decision­
making situations. See C. Plott and M. Levine, "On Using the 
Agenda t,o Influence Group Decisions: Theory, Experiments and an 
Application, " American Economic Review (forthcoming) and Social 
Science Working Paper #66, California Institute of Technology, 1975, 
The second assumption is invalid in cases in which the 
information base is insufficient to enable the problem to be solved, 
regardless of the objective. Cases in wh:.ch a regulatory issue is 
subject to considerable, irreducible uncertainty are common, yet 
these are treated no differently from cases in which information is 
relatively complete and of high quality. _/ In both types of cir cum-
_/ For example, see P. Joskow, "Approving Nuclear Power
Plants: Scientific Decisionmaking or Administrative Charade?" Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science V (Spring 1974). 
stances, the agency is expected to use its expertise in identifying a 
"best" solution. 
The aura of expertise is important for an agency to maintain , 
for it is one of the main weapons (the other is the development of a / 
constituency) an agency uses in the process by which it obtains approval 
for its budget and legislative program._/ Consequently, for both 
8_/ See.A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 
Little, Brown and Co., 1964. 
theoretical and practical reasons, an agency has powerful reasons 
to convey the image that it has solved problems. Yet, as more 
information becomes available, the " best" solution to a policy pro­
blem will change, if for no other reason that less uncertainty 
will be attached to the problem and hence there will be less reason 
to act conservatively and to maintain numerous options for future 
action . But to change the policy explicitly through time is to create 
doubt about one's expertise. Consequently, the agency has an 
incentive to keep old policies in place even after the information 
base is sufficient for experts to know that the original policy was 
an inferior choice. 
Examples of this tenacious clinging to outdated policies 
abound in regulation. Recent examples include: 
" the ambient oxidant air quality standard of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, �hich was 
set in 1971 at. 08 parts per million on the basis 
of an arithmetic mistake in calculating the thresh­
old at which damaging health effects could be 
observed; EPA has known about the mistake since 
no later than early 1973, by early 1976 had not yet 
changed the standard to an appropriate figure based 
on correct calculations (the standard should be between 
• 
15 and • 20, and the difference would cause about a 
75 percent reduction in the costs of meeting the 
s tandard)-/ 
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_/ P. Downing, " Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles,"
mimeo, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 
1975. 
• the commitment by the F C C  to the development of
UHF television as the principle ineans of increasing
competition in the broadcast industry was based
upon engineering testimony in the early 1950s that
,technical parity between UHF and VHF was only a 
few years away; however after 25 years UHF is a 
financial disaster area, while its signal quality 'is 
still poor for homes more than a few miles from the 
transmitter, yet the FCC is still committed to 
UHF rather than to cable television, satellite to 
home broadcasting or spectrum reallocation. _/ 
_/ See Noll, Peck and McGowan, op. cit. 
A final di�ficulty with regulation is that Congress has a 
strong incentive to do too much of it. A recent study of the 
cause of a dramatic increase since the mid-l 960s in the frequency 
with which incumbent Congressmen of both parties are successful 
in being reelected identifies government regulation as playing a 
major role. _/ The principal finding is that Congressmen are
_I Morris Fiorina, " The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The
Bureaucracy Did it, 11 Social Science Working Paper #100, California
Institute of Technology, 1975. 
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reelected on the basis 'of their role as ombudsman for constituents 
that are deep in a morass of Federal red tape, of which a regulatory 
proceeding is one example. Successful Congressmen campaign on 
the theme that they are "Your man in Washington who can help you" 
and allocate most of their staff to locations in the home district
where they devote most of their time to dealing with citizen complaints. 
The Congressman's stand on is sues and his general ideological 
persuasion are of decreasing importance to his reelectability. 
The theoretical basis for this development is the idea of 
"rational ignorance" in economic theories of voting behavior.-/ A 
_/ A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy , Harper 
and Row, 1957. 
voter has essentially no effect on election outcomes, and so has no
incentive to put forth effort in learning about the is sue positions of 
candidates. Furthennore, even if he does obtain information about 
each 
real, 
candidate, he can also observe that few Congressmen have 
identifiable power in Congress and that rarely does a single 
Representative' s  vote carry an issue. All other things being equal, a 
voter may vote for the candidate nearer his own persuasion on issues 
but for the foregoing reasons his commitment to that behavior is 
slight. On the other hand, as more and more economic activity 
becomes regulated, the chances increase that any given citizen will 
find it useful to have a Congressman intervene on his behalf in some 
administrative proceeding. In this role the Congressman is not one 
or 436 Representative and 100 Senators, but a single individual with 
undiluted influence . At some point in the growth of government 
regulation, a reputation for helping citizens in shepherding their 
way through administrative processes will dominate issu� positions 
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as the determining factor in voter behavior. Even a legislator who 
continually favors more regulation of the kind that generates citizen 
complaints will not pay much of a price for taking this position if he 
does a good job servicing the complaints, since his vote establishing 
the new domain of regulation usually will be unknown to some 
and, in any event, uncritical to the pas sage of the legislation, 
whereas his performance as ombudsman is easily observable and 
undiluted, From the point of view of the legislator, the process 
generates an incentive to secure one's re electability even more by 
passing laws that will increase the demand for an ombudsman in 
Washington. 
From the p1 eceeding recitation of some natural ineffi­
ciencies of regulation, the findings that regulated industries do 
not approach the competitive norm should hardly be surprising. 
Nor does it prove that regulation is never justified. The principal 
point is that regulation is a rather blunt instrument of economic 
policy that should be adopted only if the alternatives are quite 
undesirable, 
ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION 
Unfortunately, neither scholars nor politicians have been 
particularly creative in generating alternatives to the often 
unsatisfactory choice between regulation or unfettered markets. 
Yet alternatives do exist, some well-known and some not, Since 
the most promising ideas vary according to the type of regulatory 
problem, several classes of regulatory activities will be considered 
separately
, 
Natural Monopoly 
The task of regulating industries in which economies of 
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scale and/or integration are present raises an additional inherent 
problem. The economic calculus provides us with no workable 
method of setting prices in industries with average costs that
decline as output increases, If price is set equal to the additional 
costs incurred in producing the last unit of output, the industry 
will not generate enough revenues to cover costs. Any practical 
method for recovering total costs -- through prices based on 
average costs or through a tax-subsidy system -- creates ineffi_ 
ciency. Furthermore, unless one is willing to adopt a separate 
price structure for each individual, in general one can not even 
make unambiguous judgments about which of numerous price 
structures is superior, including the much-maligned cross­
subsidization practice of public utilities commissions. -/ 
_/ D. McNicol, 11 A Critique of the Debate on Deregulation, " 
mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 
1975, For the traditional wisdom on cross-subsidization, see 
R. Posner, "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science II #1 (Spring 1971), 
Public utility regulation adds another problem to natural
monopoly pricing. About the only way to regulate prices is on 
the basis of costs, and any attempt to peg profits to costs generates
an incentive t o  increase costs whenever revenues can be increased 
by raising prices._/ 
_/ See D. McNicol and A. Phillips, "Theoretical Models of 
Rate Regulation: A Survey and Critique," Fels Center of Govern ­
ment Discussion Paper No. 77, University of Pennsylvania, 1975,
Since deregulation of public utility monopolies seems 
quite attractive, the dilemma of regulation or nothing is parti­
cularly tragic in dealing with natural monopoly. Alternatives 
should be welcome. 
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The literature provides some ideas. One proposal is to 
have firms bid competitively for monopoly franchises of fixed 
duration. _/ While as stated thi� is unattractive because it "solves" 
_/ H. Demsetz, "Why Regulate Utilities," Journal of Law
and Economics, Arpil 1968. 
the monopoly problem simply by transferring the monopoly rents to 
the governnient (the monopoly prices remain), in slightly altered 
form it holds some promise. Government could specify a standard 
of performance and offer the franchise to the firm promising to 
meet the standard at the lowest price. Or government could ask 
each firm to sub1nit a bid that combined price and service specifi­
cations, and select that which in combination appeared most a 
attractive. In practice, this has been the mechanism adopted by 
most local governments in granting franchises for cable television 
systems, It has two problems. First, a firm that errs on the low 
side in estimating costs will probably win the franchise and proceed 
to fail financially, during which time service will probably be 
degraded as the firm fights for survival. Second, in cases in which 
capital as sets have very long lives -- railroads, electric utilities, 
gas companies -- either the duration of the franchise has to be quite 
long or some provision must be made for reimbursing the original 
owner for the value of the capital remaining after his tenure as
franchisee has expired. While neither of these problems is parti­
cularly grave for cable television - - service .degradation is annoying 
but hardly threatening to the foundations of society, and systems 
last about ten years - - they may be fatal for some other utilities. 
But it could work in some cases. Feeder airline routes are an 
example. 
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Another alternative is public ownership of utilities. Public 
ownership has several attractive features. It would not, presumably, 
be motivated solely by profits, and hence might not attempt to 
capture monopoly revenues, It avoids the costly and time-consuming 
regulatory·process, which paid off to municipal utilities during the 
energy crisis. Municipals were able to adjust prices to changing 
fuel costs and the generally rising costs of new generation facilities 
more rapidly than were regulated private companies. 
The main liability of public ownership is that municipals 
have less of an incentive to produce at lowest cost. Because 
they lack pure profit motives, they have some incentive to incur 
unnecessary costs that improve the welfare of employees, that 
secure political advantage for incumbent politicians, and that 
pi.irsue interesting but probably uneconomic technical ideas of 
intellectual interest to management, 
. One little noted research paper suggests a policy that 
might capture the benefits of municipal tlwnership, of profit 
orientation, and of competition. Of course, it entails a small
sacrifice -- the eschewing of the scale economies of natural 
monopoly! The findings of the research paper are that in forty­
odd cities across the country electric utilities actually compete 
for customers, and that when they do, both prices and costs are 
lower.-/ These situations are all duopolies, and all involve one 
_/ W. Primeaux, " A  Reexamination of the Monopoly Market 
Structure for Electric Utilities, "  In A. Phillips (ed. ), Promoting 
Competition in Regulated Markets, Brookings, 1975. 
; 
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private and one public firm. In each case parallel electric lines 
are strung in the areas of competition, and households can buy 
service from either firm. Apparently natural monopoly does 
exist, for the average costs of these firms decline with increased 
output; however, monopoly firms tend to operate less efficiently. 
In cities over about 25, 000 population the monopolists' average 
c osts are enough higher that two firms without full exploitation of 
scale economies are more efficient than one with all scale economies 
captured. 
Safety Regulation 
·This particular class of regulatory activities covers
controls over the hazards of products or employments that are 
visited directly upon the participants in the market -- e. g. on 
. consumers of the product or employees engaged in its production. 
It excludes policies to reduce the effects on third parties, such as. 
regulation of pollution or radiation, 
The principal alternative to safety regulation is not the 
absence of any intervention; persons damaged by products or 
employments have resort to civil litigation to recover damages 
owing to producer negligence. In the age of doctor strikes over 
medical malpractice insurance rates, the problems of using legal 
remedies need hardly be belabored. Basically, civil remedies have 
two major problems: they are expensive (lawyers claim as much 
as half of the take, and the judicial system is expensive to operate), 
and the damage awards have little relation to actual damages, 
especially if the defendant is insured and the case is tried before a 
jury. As with natural monopoly, the alternative to regulation is 
not very attractive. 
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In order to generate superior alternatives for safety 
regulation, the source of the political demand for this type of 
intervention must be explored in greater detail, One source is 
surely the inefficiency of the judicial system as a mechanism for 
protection, Another is the cost an individual faces in acquiring 
sufficient information to make good choices among products. 
Product information comes in two ways: casual experience 
through purchases and observations of the consequences of 
purchases by others, and study of the information on product 
quality produced by journalists, consumer organizations, and 
government. If a product is inexpensive, purchased frequently 
and much studied by others, quality information is relatively easy 
to obtain; however if a product is purchased infrequently, is 
expensive, requires considerable technical sophistication to under­
stand, and is not widely discussed in the media, information 
about its quality is expensive. In this case, an individual has an 
incentive to delegate the assessment of product quality to an 
expert. It is duplicative for every person to absorb all the 
relevant information on every product, and hence learning costs 
can be saved if some people trust the judgment of others. Even 
if people differ sufficiently in tastes that they would make different 
selections with identical information, delegation can still be 
optimal if the inefficiencies of delegation are small compared to 
the costs of acquiring the ability to make an informed selection, 
The preceeding discussion suggests two important points. 
First, if information becomes cheaper, fewer decision will be 
delegated and more information will be acquired and processed, 
The greater the diversity of tastes on a safety issue, the greater 
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ought to be the reliance placed on information rather than regula­
tion. For example, many issues of food purity are more matters 
of aesthetics than of health. This suggests that mandatory labeling 
of, say, percent insect parts and rodent hairs is preferable to a 
universal standard. 
Even when the issue is health, individuals can differ in 
their attitudes towards risk, particularly when the costs of risk­
avoidance are high. For example, lawn mowers are known to be 
an important source of fairly serious injuries. Studies of the source 
of injuries and the costs of avoiding them indicate that a substantial 
proportion of injuries could be avoided by adding a few design 
features to lawn mowers that would increase their costs about $40. _/
_/ "Economic Impact of Proposed Lawn Mower Safety Standards, 11 
mimeo, Consumers Union, 1975.
The data are sufficient to print on each lawn mower the probabilities 
of serious injury for machines with and without the safety features, 
leaving the decision about which to buy up to the consumer. 
When resort is made to setting standards, it should be 
kept in mind that the object is to diverge as little as possible from 
"representative" informed behavior. An expert body for assembling 
and judging information about alternative standards surely has an 
indispensable role, since the very cases for which the demand for 
standards is greatest are those involving the most sophisticated, 
complicated products. Yet experts, by their decision to take up 
careers in the prosecution of safety policies, are probably atypically 
concerned about safety issues. 
The obvious alternative is to dispense with the decision­
making power of the expert, and with the procedural requirements 
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as well. Safety rules would still be propounded by expert bodies, 
but without regard to administrative procedures. And safety rules 
could be appealed not to the courts but to Congress. Congress would 
then adopt the proposed new standards, establish new ones, or just 
fail to act. In the last case, the expert body could, of course, 
promulgate a new set of standards. In the event the expert body 
established standards to which no appeal is made in some reasonable 
period of time (a few months), the standards would become binding 
legislation,' 
Many variations on the preceeding theme are possible, but 
the basic idea is to separate the process for evaluating information 
from the ultimate policy responsibility and to free the former from 
the inherent weaknesses of the administrative process without sacri­
ficing anyone's rights. The resulting process is rather like zoning by 
local government, in which planning commissions do most of the 
work but city or county councils make the tough decisions. By 
placing the rule-making responsibility in Congress, the present 
philosophy of procedural review of regulatory decisions would be 
replaced by a substantive, political review. It would also prevent 
Congressmen from being unaccountable for the costs of regulation 
while reaping political rewards through their role as ombudsmen. 
Congress, not some executive or independent bureaucrat, would 
become the source of the red tape that generates citizen complaints. 
This mechanism is likely to be significantly more flexible 
than is the administrative process. Generally speaking, Congress 
seems more inclined to repeal or amend legislation than agencies 
are inclined to change standards. In the area of safety regulation, 
Congress has occasionally left to itself the _job of setting regulatory 
standards, notably in dealing with automobile safety. The enact­
ment and then, in the face of widespread criticism from both 
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industry and consumerists, repeal of the automobile ignition-seat 
belt interlock to prevent driving without use of belts illustrates 
the point, standing in stark contrast to EPA' s tenacious devotion
to its oxidant standard. 
All of the above arguments suggest that making Congress 
the standard-setter reduces many of the costs inherent in the 
regulatory process. Of course· this approach will not lead 
to the bliss of the perfectly competitive equilibrium, and hence 
will generate economic studies detailing its costs. Nevertheless, 
these costs are likely to be less than those incurred through the 
administrative process. 
Enviro.O:mental Regulation 
The class of regulatory policies falling under this rubric 
includes controls on third-party effects of economic activity. 
While air and water pollution and noise abatement policies are 
obvious examples, also included are nuclear safety regulation 
and land-use planning, 
Environmental problems provide the strongest argument 
for government intervention in private market decisicms, yet 
they pose probably the most difficult policy problems. They arise 
because some economic activities impose uncompensated costs 
on parties that are not engaged in the production or use of the 
product of the economic activity. Such circumstances .arise 
because the political and legal system has not defined enforceable 
property rights that can be transacted in markets. In most 
instances, the absence of tradable rights is tracable to high costs 
of defining and enforcing them. For: example, the rights of each 
person to his "fair share" of air, which can be maintained in a 
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pure state or traded to a rendering plant, cannot be defined in a 
way that conveys to each person an independent, tradable property. 
In the absence of a market for air, firms have an incentive to use 
it intensively as an input to production processes -- it is a free 
yet productive resource. Consequently, firms that follow cost­
minimizing strategies will pollute long past the point at which the 
benefit of pollution to the firm begins to fall short of the cost of 
pollution to its receptors. 
The problen-1s of regulating environmental degradation 
are especially difficult, For the same set of reasons that 
environmental property rights are difficult to establish and trade, 
regulatory standards are very difficult to enforce, And because 
of the absence of direct markets for environmental resources, 
identification of the optirnum degree of environmental 
degradation is, practically speaking, impossible, even if 
scientific knowledge were complete enough -- which it is not 
to provide an understanding of the relationship between emissions 
and damages. 
The economics literature has focused on taxation as an 
alternative to standard-setting._
/ 
One advantage of emissions 
I- Generally, see W. Baumol and W. Oates, "The Use of 
Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment," 
Swedish Journal of Economics V. LXXIII (March 1971 ). For a 
specific application, see 0, Hausgaard, "Proposed Tax on Sulphus 
Content of Fossil Fuels, " Public Utilities Fortnightly, September 
16, 1971, and Senate Bill S3057, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972. 
taxes compared to standards is that they ·require less detailed 
knowledge about the optimal abatement strategies for each class 
of pollu�er and less uniformity of treatment among polluters. Also 
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important -- and inseparable -- is the issue of who would set 
either tax rates or standards. For the reasons advanced in the 
discussion of safety standards, a case can be made for leaving to 
Congress the ultimate responsibility for setting either, for making 
the role of the expert more advisory, and for relaxing the 
requirements of the traditional administrative procedures that are 
imposed upon the expert body. 
In addition, because environmental problems arise from 
a failure to define tradable property rights, more attention should 
be given to creating surrogate markets that would have the same 
effect on pollution as would a market for environmental resources. 
One such possibility :s the creation of tradable pollution licenses, 
distributed to all citizens, which sum to the overall emissions 
standards promulgated by legislation._
/ 
Polluters would then 
_
/ 
For a detailed exposition, see W. Montgomery, "Markets 
in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs," Journal 
of Economic Theory V, no. 3 (December, 1972). 
bid for these licenses to pollute, and abatement would. be achieved 
at least cost without the government needing to investigate the 
technical and economic aspects of alternative abatement strategies. 
The advantages of this system compared to taxes are twofold. 
First, the government can directly determine the acceptable level 
of pollution without bothering to take on the impossible task of 
calculating the tax rate that would achieve it._
/ 
Second, the 
_
/ 
See J, Griffin, "An Econometric Evaluation of Sulfur Taxes, 11 
Journal of Political Economy LXXII• no. 4 (July-August 1974). 
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license system avoids conveying the mistaken impression that it is 
possible to set a tax that represents the cost to society of an addi­
tional unit of pollution. By reducing the information requirements 
for setting standards and the misplaced aura of scientific precision 
that surrounds them, the policy-making process is likely to be less 
costly and more flexible, 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to contribute some 
perspective to economic analyses of the regulatory process by 
emphasizing that economically optimal institutional arrangements 
for coping with problems of market failure are not likely to be 
found and by pointing out that policy-makers and researchers have 
not treated seriously enough some of the alternative approaches 
to dealing with these problems. 
In adopting regulatory policies, the policy-makers seem 
to have lost sight of the source of the objections to market outcomes 
that might justify intervention, The policy issues examined here 
decreasing cost industries, safety, and environmental protection 
do not arise because decentralized decisions are inherently faulty, 
but because some important feature of a well-functioning 
decentralized process is missing, eg. , numerous participants 
in the market, cheap and reliable information, or tradable 
property rights. Regulation creates a centralized authority 
with the job of attempting to guess how decisions might be 
altered if these problems did not exist, It does not try to 
patch these holes in the market so that decentralized decisions 
can still be the primary determinant of economic outcomes. 
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The arguments in this paper constitute pleas for greater 
emphasis on the latter approach and, when that is not feasible, for 
less formality, greater dependence on the political system, and 
greater honesty about the precision with which "optimal" 
performance criteria can be established and enforced than is 
typical of regulatory processes. 
